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Beyond Earth Summit ‘92 
Redefining the International Security Agenda
Chetan Kumar
In 1978 the people of the Tehn Garhwal district in the Uttar Pradesh province of India launched a protest 
movement against a federally funded dam project that had been under construction since 1968 According to the 
organizers of the movement dam related activities had caused wide scale deforestation landslides soil erosion 
and other forms of ecological adversity in the area thereby resulting in senous disruption of the livelihood 
patterns of the local populace Despite extensive popular participation in the protest the Indian government 
continued the project.1
By the mid 1980s the protest movement had spawned a separaust demand for carving out a new province 
called Uttarkhand from the existing Uttar Pradesh province Those advocating this demand declared that the local 
population was seeking greater empowerment vis à vis the existing federal provincial power structure 
Simultaneously on behalf of the local population public interest litigation was filed with the Indian Supreme 
Court by the World Wildlife Fund and other domestic as well as international nongovernmental organizations 
under Article 32 of the Indian constitution As the decade drew to a close the Indian government had not 
arranged for a hearing on the subject, the separatist movement in the region had intensified and the number of 
federal paramilitary troops in the Tehn-Garhwal district had increased substanually Even as the Uttarkhand 
movement intensified the Indian government faced similar movements spawned by ecological factors which 
were further complicated by population migrations in the Northeastern provinces of Bihar and Assam These 
uprisings coincided with disputes between India and Bangladesh on the sharing of the waters of the Ganges river 
and also over India s dam building activities on the Brahmaputra river which flows through Bangladesh for a 
large section of its course According to the Bangladesh government Indian activity on the river was leading to 
disastrous changes in the patterns of flooding rainfall soil erosion and forest growth in the Brahmaputra 
catchment area thereby causing severe social and economic disruptions for large sections of the Bangladeshi 
population 2
Apart from new internal insurgencies and the Brahmaputra/Ganges dispute through the 1980s India was 
also embroiled m river water sharing disputes of varying intensity with both Pakistan and Nepal These internal 
emergencies as well as external tensions helped vitiate what Indian officials saw as already being an extremely 
tense security environment m the South Asian subcontinent While the increases in the Indian defense budget in 
the 1980s were no doubt prompted by tensions with Pakistan over terrorist violence in the Punjab and Kashmir 
provinces they also included massive appropriations for paramilitary forces that are largely used to deal with 
domestic turbulence Ironically the moneys spent on the paramilitary forces by an increasingly nervous Indian 
state could have been used in economic activities that might have helped alleviate some of the ecological crises 
that had contributed to an increase in the level of both domestic and external tensions
Many of these problems remained intact as India entered the 1990s Like many other developing countries 
India participated in the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro and like many of them it joined the chorus in 
asserting that since the West s resource intensive economies were the most likely culprits in bringing about the 
global ecological crisis the West should bear the burden for alleviating it Despite transboundary resource 
sharing disputes with its neighbors India joined other leading developing countries— such as Malaysia 
Indonesia and Brazil many of whom are currently facing internal ecological problems similar to India s— in 
asserting the sovereign authority of states over their domestic resources and consequently over the means 
through which they are exploited 3 Led by India developing countries declared themselves averse to the 
activities of intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations that opposed programs on 
ecological grounds like the Tehn dam project The developing countries interpreted these activities as
1 See Shaukat Hassan Environmental Issues and Security in South Asia Adelphi Papers 262 (Autumn 1991) 3 9 -4 0
2 Ibid 16-20
3 See The Earth Wars cover story India Today 15 June 1992
2infringements of their sovereignty and as complicating what they perceived as being already tough 
developmental choices
Faced with this opposition most Western participants kept the discourse limited to safe subjects such as 
ozone depletion and global warming and diplomats and scientists traded repartee over the scientific validity of 
the data on these matters While the sparse Agenda 21 document that was released at the end of the Summit 
made references to issues such as soil degradation resource depletion and population displacement, substantive 
negotiation over the environmental fallout of these crises was not accomplished at the Summit— even though 
given the fact that the conference was billed as the UN Conference on Environment and Development these 
issues should have been at the top of the agenda 4
While concerted US leadership in this regard might have made a difference US diplomats at the meeting 
repeatedly made it clear that they thought the entire affair was redundant particularly since international 
instruments are already m place to deal with issues such as ozone depletion biodiversity conservation and 
global warming 5 While these global environmental problems would no doubt threaten the entire world 
system if not adequately dealt with what was clearly missing at the Summit was an empirically grounded 
understanding of the linkages between more localized ecological cnses and the security of nation states
This brief paper attempts to delineate these linkages through a three step modus operandi First, through an 
exposition of the ongoing changes m the theoretical understanding of international security Second through 
an application of this new understanding to the study of the role of ecological cnses in the international system 
And thud through the positing of an analytical framework through which this role might be better studied both 
theoretically and empirically
Theory and International Secunty
The study of international secunty has mostly been the preserve of the realist school of scholars in which they 
have posited the nation state as being the centerpiece of the international system its security concerns have been 
the pnmary focus of international secunty studies Since the pnmary secunty concern of most nation states is 
presumably their long term survival capabilities the latter have been the focus of most theorizing in this area 6
Operationalizing security however has proved to be a far more difficult task Since it is difficult to 
empincally determine at what point a nation state is most likely to consider itself completely secure most 
scholars have tended to equate secunty with the perceived power of a state to defend itself from attack or to 
prosecute war against other states m order to prevent attack Secunty studies have thus tended to largely 
become studies of war of ways of preventing war and of the various constituents of power 7
Since power is a concept that has presented just as many empirical difficulties in terms of pinning it down 
scholars have tended to treat it as being either an aggregate of a state s social economic and military resource 
indicator— as compared to the indicators of other states— or an estimation of a state s place in a perceived 
international power structure For instance m a bipolar structure a state s power may depend upon its 
dependence upon a particular pole or the degree of independence that it might possess vis a vis either pole
Whatever the forms of measurement the equation of security with accumulated power— seen for the most 
part as the ability of a state to prosecute war or to militarily defend itself— has meant that the field of 
international secunty studies has rarely ventured beyond the study of military secunty
On the other hand the study of ecological cnses and the international system has largely been the preserve 
of the liberals among international relations theonsts For the most part the focus of such a study has been 
the cooperative processes associated with attempts to solve these crises All of the constructs associated with
4 See Rio Coming Together To Save the Earth coverstory Tune 1 June 1992
5 For a strong argument contrary to the official US stance at the summit see Janet Welsh Brown ed in the US Inte est 
Resources Growth and Security in the Developing World (Boulder Colo Westview Press 1990)
6  See Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society (London Macmillan 1977)
7 See Alfons Sollner German Conservatism in America Morgenthau s Political Realism Telos 12  (Summer 1987) 161-72
3liberal theorizing— international regimes epistemic communities integration and so on— have been brought 
to bear on the study of international cooperation and environmental conservation Within the plethora of 
theoretical and empirical literature on international environmental cooperation the literature on international 
environmental conflict has been relatively sparse
Given the focus of international security studies on military conflict and the study of international 
environmental politics on supranational cooperation it is not surprising that scholars from the two areas have 
rarely found little common ground A gradually changing agenda for international security studies however 
might soon change that Three changes m this regard are worth noting8
The first change mvolves attempts to understand the security of states in terms of their insecurity While 
it may be difficult to empirically pinpoint the moment at which a state considers itself secure the various 
factors that might contribute to a state s insecurity are far easier to pinpoint These factors do not just anse 
from the actions o f other states but from events at both the global as well as the subnational levels At the 
subnational level for instance it is not just states that feel insecure societies and social groups can expenence 
insecurity too thereby adding to the overall insecurity of the nation states that preside over them Colloquially 
speaking this new dimension of insecurity opens up a whole new can of worms For example the excessive 
pursuit of security by nation states in the short term could detract from democratic practice as well as the pursuit 
of socioeconomic development Inducing further societal insecurity tin turn could add to the insecurity of the 
state m the long term 9 Similarly a state facing internal revolt might pursue an aggressive military policy 
externally in an attempt to unite domestic populations through a reaffirmation of national identity At the 
global level worldwide ecological crises such as ozone depletion and the nse m sea levels due to global 
warming might have differentiated local impacts thereby leading to international tensions through population 
migrations and refugee flows
The fact that nation states might consider themselves insecure due to factors arising at the global national 
and the subnational levels takes the study of international security beyond the dynamics of interstate conflict and 
power struggle Some scholars have suggested that the notion of security be expanded to include an 
understanding of levels of security along the lines of levels of analysis 10 Such theoretical expansion it is 
believed could lead to a better understanding of those factors that increase the insecurity of nation states
The second change in international security studies involves an understanding of the power whereby nation 
states could keep insecurities at bay Empirically speaking power is increasingly measured not in terms of an 
aggregation of resources or military might but in terms of the states ability to mitigate those factors that 
mercase their insecurity In order to be effective such mitigation would require that states bnng appropriate 
resources to bear in specific issue areas Not all problems can be solved through bilateral bluster possession of 
nuclear weapons for instance does not translate into effectiveness in multilateral trade negotiations even 
though the latter attribute might be more necessary for a state s long term viability than the former
While this issue has been partially addressed in the current literature on international security through the 
notion of fungibility of power in other words the ability to translate effective power across issue areas it has 
not been considered in the light of states abilities (or lack thereof) to deal with specific insecurities For 
instance while a state may be able to translate its capacity for effective negotiations m the area of nuclear 
proliferation to that of multilateral trade this translation still does not imply that it will be able to deal 
comprehensively with terrorism atmospheric pollution ethnic turbulence resource depletion or some other 
source of insecurity This is because the removal of insecurity might not be a dependent variable of a state s 
possession of fungible power resources but of the role of other actors (national subnational or 
intergovernmental) in a particular issue area For instance the dispute between India and Bangladesh might not
8 See Friedrich Kratochwil The Challenge of Security in a Changing World Journal o f International Affairs 43  1 (Summer Fall 
1989) 119-41 Also see R B J Walker Slate Sovereignty Global Civilization and the Rearticulaüon of Political Space World Order 
Studies Program Occasional Paper No 18 (Princeton N J  Princeton University 1988)
9 S eeR  B J  Walker One World Many Worlds Struggles fo r a Just World Peace (Boulder Colo Lynne Reinner 1988)
10 See Marvin G Weinbaum Competing and Cooperating Security Regimes in South Asia paper presented at the MCISS 
Workshop on South Asian Security Chicago 25 May 1991
4be resolved unilaterally by either side it might not be resolved at all without the mediation of an international 
environmental actor such as the United Nations Environment Program A neutral mediator may be necessary to 
carry out independent studies of the Brahmaputra/Ganges catchment areas upon which any reliable solution could 
be based11
The key point here is that in an issue area different actors may because of the transboundary nature of a 
problem face insecurity together The only practical way to deal with this would be through multilateral action 
that enhances security for all parties simultaneously In other words security need not be a zero sum game for 
different actors the increase m the security of one actor need not detract from the security of another contrary to 
the billiard ball perspective of traditional realist s theorizing in this regard12
The third change in international security studies is related to a broader ongoing theoretical evolution m the 
discipline of international relations 13 As with international security studies international relations has focused 
on the nation state as the definitive unit of the international system Interstate interaction has been considered as 
being the primary form of interaction m the international system and students of war as well as of international 
cooperation have studied these phenomena in light of the motives and actions of states Consequently students 
of international security have largely limited themselves to states in their theoretical and empirical search for the 
sources as well as the solutions to the problems regarding security To the extent that the role of international 
organizations in security related issues has been studied it has been limited to intergovernmental organizations 
the actions of which have been explained m terms of the motives of their member states
These perspectives however are evolving as scholars see the transition of the world system from being 
state centric (or one where the state is the primary center of international activity) to one where the state is only 
one of the several important centers 14 While traditionally the juridical and territorial sovereignty of states has 
been assumed to be justification enough for awarding them the pride of place m the world system the 
increasingly important role of transnational and subnational actors has led to an understanding of the importance 
of these actors in terms of policy autonomy Increasingly the power of actors is measured in terms of their 
functional ability to maneuver around as well as manipulate the structural relationships within issue areas 
Titular sovereignty is no longer a guarantee that a state will predominate within an issue area For example 
while the United States is the dominant actor m the area of rapid military deployment, the International 
Monetary Fund pursues a strongly autonomous agenda m the area of international finance and transnational 
corporations play an equally autonomous role m the transboundary flow of goods and services
It must be pointed out here that the emergence of autonomous non state actors does not imply the eclipse of 
the state system or of the power of states Given their monopoly over the use of military force which is 
increasingly under attack from transnational irredentist and ethnic networks states still retain then power m 
those issue areas that involve such usage What has  changed is that the overall policy domain of the state has 
been severely constricted because of the emergence of several issue areas where the state as traditionally 
organized is limited in its capacity to generate outcomes Three factors can be pinpointed as being responsible 
for these changes in the world system
At the subnational level the world population is in the midst of a skills revolution that has drastically 
altered the manner in which people create store and distribute information The creation of worldwide computer 
networks and the ease with which larger numbers of people have access to stored and printed data has made 
state control over specialized knowledge a thing of the past Coupled with satellite technology and the 
ubiquitous fax machine the skills revolution has served to not only make national borders more porous 15 but
11 For some arguments along these lines see Patncia M Mische Ecological Security and the Need to Reconceptualize 
Sovereignty Alternatives XIV  (1989) 389-427
12 See Security Sovereignty and the Challenge of World Politics R B J Walker Alternai ves XV (1990) 3 27
13 This discussion draws largely upon James Rosenau Turbulence in World Politics A Theory o f Continuity and Change 
(Princeton N J Princeton University Press 1990)
14 See Forest L G neves ed Transnationalism in World Politics and Business (Tarrytown N Y  Pergamon Press 1979)
15 See particularly Stephen J Rosow The Forms of Internationalization Representation of Western Culture on a Global Scale 
Alternatives X V  (1990) Also see Ronnie D Lipschutz Heteronomia The Emergence of Global Civil Society paper presented at the 
meeting of the International Studies Association Atlanta 31 M arch-4 Apnl 1992
5has helped reduce the absolute control that governments can exercise over their citizenry New information and 
knowledge are created and disseminated and used to further political or economic causes at rates that often 
overwhelm governments capacity to control them
At the global level the key development has been the emergence of various problems that fall within the 
genre o f global problém atique problems such as human rights abuses environmental degradation nuclear 
proliferation trade disputes currency instabilities underdevelopment terrorism ethnic turbulence and civil 
conflict16 The increasing interdependence created by global economic integration entails collective responses 
for the g loba l problém atique on the part of nation states These collective responses often take the form of 
international mechanisms that center around intergovernmental organizations While the latter have states as 
members and are formally constituted so as to reflect states agendas they nevertheless provide fertile breeding 
grounds for transnational interaction In that intergovernmental organizations bring together individuals from 
around the world m order to formulate relevant policy they allow these individuals to develop and propagate 
agendas that might not coincide directly with those of the member governments
Interdependence has also caused the various problems constituting the global problem atic to be propagated 
throughout the world system through the various points of interconnection with a rapidity that has often 
overwhelmed the capacity of the states policy apparatus to deal with them 17 While cnses such as the perceived 
ecological crisis have an obvious global basis less obvious ones such as ethnic turbulence now appear to be 
constantly overflowing state boundaries and often rocking the entire world system 18 Into the performance gap 
between mushrooming crises and inadequate state capacity has moved a variety of increasingly autonomous 
actors— the bureaucracies of intergovernmental organizations NGOs (both domestic and international) 
transnational networks that do everything from conserving the environment to laundering drug money elite 
policy communities and even powerful individuals
Furthermore the solutions to many of the cascading cnses in the contemporary world system often require 
rapid organizational and technological innovations that many isolated and inertial state bureaucracies are unable 
to generate In that transnational interaction bnngs together diverse skills and technologies it facilitates rapid 
innovation This is particularly true in the areas of environment conservation currency management and 
sustainable development
The changes at the subnational and global levels have also led to changes at the interstate level In a state 
centric system as the sovereign and final arbiters of the destinies of their consütuents states exercised 
authoritative control over all interaction between their ciUzens and those of other states In theory as well as 
practice interaction at the global level was interstate interaction In the emerging world system this state 
centncity is no longer universal While theoretically speaking state power exists as it always has in practice 
interaction at the global level is increasingly transnational19 interaction This change can be attributed to the 
remarkable coincidence of the skills revolution at the subnational level with the emergence of cascading cnses at 
the global level
16 In this regard see Samir Amin Giovanni Arrighi Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerslein Dynamics o f Global Crisis 
(New York Monthly Review Press 1982) Also see Immanuel Wallerstein Geopolitics and Geoculture Essays on the Changing Wo Id
J  System (Cambridge England Cambridge University Press 1991)
17 See particularly Gottfried Mayer Kress Chaos and Cnses in International Systems paper presented at SHAPE Technology 
Symposium on Cnsis Management Mons Belgium 19—20 March 1992
18 See Ethnicity the State and the New International Order by Cynthia H Enloe in John F Stack ed The Prunordial 
Challenge Ethnicity m the Contemporary World (New York N Y Greenwood Press 1986) Also see John F Stack ed Ethnic 
Identities in a Transnational World (New York N Y  Greenwood Press 1981)
19 For definition purposes it must be pointed out that while international interaction refers to relations between legitimately 
constituted governments (and is therefore interstate interaction) transnational interaction refers to relations between 
nongovernmental actors across country boundaries
6The various changes in the field of international security studies 20 as well as in the discipline of 
international relations that have been prompted by the ongoing changes in the world system could help bridge 
the gap that has hitherto existed between the students of international security and international environmental 
politics First understanding that the security problems of states derive from factors at all levels of world 
politics and increases the insecurity o f states could lead to a greater appreciation of the ecological causes of 
insecurity This is particularly so given that these causes often do not originate in interstate relations but at the 
global or the subnational levels
Second, the reconceptuahzation of power m terms of a state s functional ability to rid itself of specific 
kinds of insecurity in different issue areas allows analysts to move away from absolutist definitions of security 
that often do not extend beyond military security or war related activities In that a state might try to alleviate 
insecurity in a particular issue area through positive sum collective bargaining with other actors the study of 
attempts to increase security need not necessarily imply the invocation of Hobbes Both these developments 
allow analysts to incorporate ecological cnses within the range of problems that could detract from a state s 
security it also allows them to mclude environmental cooperation within the purview of attempts to increase 
states security
Finally the emergence of numerous autonomous actors to challenge state centnsm leads analysts to an 
understanding of the fact that both environmental problems as well as solutions to them can emerge entirely 
from transnational as opposed to international interaction at the very least the process of mitigating ecological 
threats to state security is likely to involve a plethora of non state actors
Theory and Environmental Security
Some observers will assert that even if the theoretical and analytical understanding of security were to be 
broadened to cover ecological threats doing so would seriously dilute the term m its practical usage After all 
cutting down trees does not kill people in the same way as nuclear detonation does 21 However the fact 
remains as will be shortly demonstrated that ecological cnses could pose just as great a threat to the survival 
capacity of a state as might a neighbonng state s nuclear weapons
The literature that deals with the social and political aspects of environmental crises is so vaned that trying 
to pinpoint and analyze the specific threats to state secunty could be a gargantuan task A beginning however 
can be made by identifying the components of an ecological cnsis that might threaten state secunty
Every ecological cnsis starts with certain kinds of human activity that have an impact on the environment 
This impact may or may not be substantial enough to prompt major environmental changes These changes m 
turn depending upon certain factors might lead to large scale social disruptions Finally social disruptions 
might cause certain kinds of conflict It is only when conflict is created that we have a threat to security
The chain of causation is thus marked by a transition from human activity to environmental changes from 
environmental changes to social disruptions and from social disruptions to conflict22 At each stage various 
intervening variables may allow or prevent the transition to the next stage as well as determine the intensity of 
the next stage The key to analyzing environmental threats to secunty lies in determining these vanables
Political Vanables
The vanables at each stage can be broadly divided into five categones The first set of vanables can be termed 
political vanables These vanables involve the nature of the political system under which the chain of causation
20 For further elaboration of these changes see George Sorensen Peace and Secunty Concepts and Strategies in Chadwick 
Alger and Michael Stohl eds A Just Peace Through Transformation Cultural Economic and Political Foundal onsfor Change (Boulder 
Colo Westview Press 1988)
21 For more arguments against linking ecological cnses with national secunty see Daniel Deudney Die Case Against Linking 
Environmental Degradation and National Secunty Millennium 19 (3) (Winter 1990) 461 76
22 This chain of causation is along the lines of the one identified in Thomas F Homer Dixon On the Threshold Environmental 
Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict International Security 16 (2) (Fall 1991)
7leading to an ecological crisis might occur For instance while large dam projects are associated with problems 
relating to population displacement forest submersion and ecosystem damage m the developing world 23 their 
consequences are hardly as inimical in the developed world The Tennessee Valley Authority projects m the 
United States have not had even a fraction of the adverse social consequences that the similarly scaled Narmada 
Valley projects in India have had24 (even though the long term ecological impact could be equally disastrous m 
either case)25 The answer lies partly m the responsiveness of the political system to the affected populations 
While the Indian system has proved unable to respond to the needs of the displaced populations (most of which 
are aboriginal and therefore marginalized socially as well as economically from the societal mainstream)26 a 
well developed infrastructure for the maintenance of civil rights and due process m the United States has ensured 
that the affected populations are adequately compensated The nature of the political system also determines the 
extent to which the affected populations are likely to use violent means to turn upon the state While such 
populations in parts of the Philippines India Brazil Malaysia and Indonesia have taken to arms one hardly 
expects to see the lumberjacks of Oregon take up arms against the United States government in retaliation for 
the latter s protection of the spotted owl
Level of Technology
A second group of variables mvolves the level o f  technology  that might be brought to bear on a particular 
economic activity The large dam projects m the developed West for instance are implemented after 
sophisticated environmental impact surveys that minimize adverse short term environmental fallout Constant 
monitoring often employing complex computer simulations and forecasting ensures that long term ecological 
effects are anticipated and prepared for In contrast, various large scale river development projects in Thailand 27 
Ethiopia Egypt, and in the Gujarat province of India have resulted in increased soil salinity desertification and 
ecosystem damage to the point where the very agricultural activities that they were meant to foster have been 
seriously disrupted 28 While this may not always be so (for instance Costa Rica while possessing a far lower 
level of technological and economic development than either India or Brazil has a better environmental record 
than either of them) the level of technology might be related to the overall level of economic development of a 
country Also the economic infrastructure of a society might make for a faster recovery in the case of 
ecological disasters For example the travails of Ronda residents in the wake of Humcane Andrew were of a 
lower intensity than those of people m Bangladesh who are affected by annual flash flooding
Some observers might point out that centenng analyses of ecosystem damage caused by large dam projects 
on the developing countnes alone is unjustified particularly given the fact many of these projects are funded by 
Western dominated institutions such as the World Bank Besides the intensive and nonsustainable land use that 
large dam projects support m general has led to soil erosion of disastrous proportions even in parts of the 
American West While both these observations are valid the fact remains that though the initial designs for 
dam projects in the developing world that are funded by aid institutions include adequate environmental 
procedures (or they would not be eligible for such funding) the lack of adequate technology and political will on 
the part of the developing countnes prevents these procedures from being fully implemented Also while the 
long term ecological fallout of large scale intensive agnculture might be the same in both the developing and 
the developed worlds the presence of adequate technological and socioeconomic backups in the latter forestalls 
the social disruptions caused by such fallout
23 See Shaukat Hassan Environmental Issues and Security in South Asia 23 37 38
24 See Baba Amte The Case Against Narmada and the Alternative Perspective (Anandwan India Narmada Bachao Andolan 
1990)
25 For a brief analyses of the adverse long term ecological consequences of US agricultural practices see Jack Doyle Altered 
Harvest (New York N Y Penguin Books 1984) Also see reports in The New York Times September 30 1984 and The Global 2000  
Report (New York N Y Penguin Books 1982)
26 For an assessment of the Sardar Sarovar Dam project in Central India m this regard see Bradford Morse et al Sardar 
Sarovar Report of the Independent Review Resource Futures International (1992)
27 See B S Cox Thailand s Nam Choam Dam A Disaster in the Making The Ecologist 16 (6) 2 1 2 -2 0
28 For further details on the adverse effects of large scale dam projects in the developing world see Edward Goldsmith and 
Nicholas Hildyard The Social and Environmental Effects o f Large Dams (Cornwall England Wadebndge Ecological Center 1986)
8Social Systems
A third group of variables involves the socia l system m which a particular set of human activities that affect the 
environment might be embedded. Certain populations might be culturally more prone to a militant response 
than others For instance many aboriginal populations m parts of India regard their forest habitat as not just a 
place of residence but of considerable religious and cultural significance Similar attitudes can be found among 
most rain forest populations throughout the world and foster a greater amount of militancy in response to 
displacement than might be found in the W est29 Also given their socioeconomic marginalization many 
aboriginal populations find it difficult to integrate with the population groups in those areas they are forced to 
emigrate to and might even spark a militant reaction among the latter For instance displaced populations 
from Bangladesh crossed over into the Indian province of Assam in the decades leading into the 1980s By the 
mid 1980s the reaction among the indigenous Assamese population had sparked off a full blown militant 
insurgency targeted both at the immigrants and the Indian state that had offered them refuge Not only was the 
security environment in a key border province vitiated, Indo Bangladesh relations were soured for years30 
Elsewhere tribal groups displaced by forest development activities in Brazil and the Philippines31 face cultural 
extinction in the alien urban environments into which they have been forced following their displacement
Societal factors more so than technology or the level of economic development, can also determine the 
extent to which a society or a country is able to adjust to resource depletion For instance a society that is 
accustomed to certain patterns of consumption might, when faced with the depletion of resources that sustain 
those patterns opt for confhctual strategies for augmenting the depleted resources rather than develop 
alternatives The lack of a US initiative in developing alternatives to petroleum even as it uses military might 
to maintain its oil supplies can be seen as a case in point
Yet another societal factor that might affect the course of ecological crises involves the extent to which a 
society s internal structure might permit the organization of groups whereby militant opposition to social 
disruptions might be expressed For instance the pluralistic and multilayered societies of both Burma and India 
permit the formation of militant groups that provide a conduit for displaced populations to vent their frustration 
through adopting adversarial relationships vis a vis other groups Such groups are quite likely to cross national 
boundaries in the pursuit of their objectives Rebels in the Chittagong hills of Bangladesh clash often with 
Indian border forces32 and rebel armies from both sides of the border crisscross the Indo Burmese frontier 
Elsewhere the Armenian residents of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan who see themselves as having 
borne the brunt of the adverse side effects of the latter s attempts to develop its natural resources have embroiled 
Armenia and Azerbaijan in a deadly war in an attempt to fulfill their irredentist aspirations
Type of Actors
The fourth set of factors pertains to the type o f  actors that might be associated with an ecological crisis Beyond 
the presence of the state actors subnational as well as transnational actors can make a crucial difference as to 
whether an environmental crisis actually leads to social disruptions and whether these social disruptions result 
m conflict For instance when the extent of the ozone depletion became evident in the mid 1980s timely 
direction by the leaders of the European Community and particularly by British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher resulted in a senes of treaties and conventions leading to the gradual phasing out of 
chlorofluorocarbons the chemicals pnmanly responsible for depleting atmospheric ozone The key actor in 
these events that might have staved off unprecedented social disruption worldwide was a transnational network of 
scienusts and policy makers— referred to in international relations literature as an example of a transnational
29 While militant response to environmental displacement has been reported among the native populations of North America and 
Australia the size of the populations involved and therefore the security nsk is considerably greater in the developing world
30 See Sanjoy Hazanka Bangladesh and Northeast India Migration Land Pressure and Ethnic Conflict paper presented at a 
workshop on Environmental Change Population Displacement and Acute Conflict Ottawa 18-19  June 1991
31 See Gareth Porter and Delfin Ganapin Jr Resources Population and the Philippines Future A Case Study World Resources 
Institute Paper No 4 1988
32 See Shaukat Hassan Environmental Issues and Security in South Asia 25
9epistemic community 33— that lobbied extensively with the Western governments to get the relevant 
international conventions prepared and signed and crucial domestic legislation enacted 34
On the other hand a network of transnational as well as subnational actors played a crucial role m ensuring 
that the World Bank funded POLONOROESTE project m Brazil s Amazon region was stopped before clearing of 
the Amazon rain forests resulted in social as well as ecological disruptions of massive proportions35 The 
campaign which occurred in the mid 1980s involved many domestic nongovernmental organizations that took 
on the task of resettling and providing for displaced populations which probably forestalled large scale and 
endemic social violence Similar campaigns are currently ongoing m India Malaysia and Indonesia.
Supranational or intergovernmental actors can also play a role m mitigating the adverse security fallout of 
ecological crises In South Asia the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been 
attempting to make linkages between disarmament, environment economic development and the national 
security o f developing countries36 both in terms of policy discourse as well as practice Interestingly enough it 
has been aided in this task by international organizations of every hue and color
For instance the efforts of international nongovernmental organizations (or NGOs) UN agencies domestic 
NGOs as well as various technical experts led to a collective attempt on the part of SAARC to address the 
environmental security issue in South Asia at its third meeting in Kathmandu in 1987 The government 
delegates found that they were short on data on which to base constructive decisions at a regional level 
Characteristically the member governments not only lacked the technical expertise to carry out adequate region 
wide or national surveys they also as per the priorities of the old nation state system were too driven by 
bilateral rivalries to collectively formulate a comprehensive plan on the subject
Here is where the role of transnational interaction became evident After having been persuaded to do so by 
various NGOs several intergovernmental agencies stepped in The Food and Agricultural Organizations (FAO) 
helped formulate environmental legislation for Bhutan The World Bank the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) the FAO and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) 
began to provide funding and technical assistance for many regional projects on the environment and 
development The International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (an NGO) helped 
Pakistan prepare its country report for SAARC s regional initiative on the environment The Danish 
International Development Agency pitched in with similar help for Bangladesh and India 37
More importantly these agencies did their work not in collaboration with the various governments— except 
at a superficial official level— but in coordination with NGOs that are engaged in environmental and 
development work Given the fact that these NGOs operate at the grassroots level they are often better suited to 
provide relevant details on the impact of development strategies on local biological and social environments than 
the urban technocracies Of interest here is the fact that at every stage of this process from agenda setting to 
actual execution NGOs representing assorted citizenry played a key role They collaborated with external 
agencies in a direct and autonomous fashion and not at the behest of national governments In most cases 
given the gravity of the environmental security dilemma in South Asia states only followed m the footsteps of 
civic society Given the gradual transition of the world system from being a state centric one to a more 
decentralized form this is only to be expected What is of significance here is that while these interactions were 
promoted and sustained by international organizations they helped contain some of the interstate tensions that 
had cropped up in the wake of the ecological crises of the 1980s It is too early to say whether— in the absence
33 In this regard see Peter Haas ed special issue of Internal onal Organizat on 46 (1) (Winter 1992) devoted to the study of 
epistemic communities
34 See especially Peter Haas Banning Chlorofluorocarbons Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone 
International Organization 46 (1) (Winter 1992)
35 See Bruce Rich The Emperor s New Clothes The World Bank and Environmental Reform World Policy Journal (Spring 
1990)
36 In this regard see Disarmament Environment and Development and Their Relevance to the Least Developed Countries 
Research Paper No 10  United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 1991
37 These details are drawn from Shaukat Hassan Environmental Issues and Security in South Asia International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (ESS) Adelphi Paper 262  (Autumn 1991)
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of political will on the part of the region s governments— the international organizations involved in will be 
able to «nain the resolution of key environmental problems However by helping initiate and sustain a 
constructive dialogue they have definitely contributed to keeping a lid on the tensions
World Systemic Visibility
The fifth and final set of factors affecting the transition from environmental crisis to social disruption and 
conflict has to do with the world systemic visibility of a particular issue The greater the visibility of an issue 
the more likely it is to attract international attention and therefore become the focus of attempts to resolve it 
before it results in widespread ecological damage social disruption and conflict For instance the clearing of 
the Amazon rain forests38 the depletion of the ozone layer39 and the radioactive fallout of nuclear accidents are 
three examples of issues that are likely to cause widespread social disruption and conflict worldwide and have 
cascading and uncertain transboundary effects International attempts to resolve these issues has therefore been 
considerably more intensive than efforts to deal with for instance the civil war in Sudan or with the numerous 
insurgencies arising out of the social disruption caused by the environmental holocaust perpetrated by the former 
Soviet Union on its constituent republics
Summarizing the discussion so far ecological crises that affect state security can be seen as consisting of 
four elements— human economic activity ecological changes resulting from this activity social disruptions 
prompted by these changes and finally the conflict that ensues from these disruptions The causal chain 
leading from human economic acuvity to deadly conflict involves three transitions— human economic activity 
to ecological damage ecological damage to social disruption and from social disruption to conflict Each of 
these transitions may or may not occur depending upon the following five sets of variables— the nature of the 
political systems involved the level of technology in the surrounding society the social system in which the 
causal chain is embedded the types of actors involved in the various interactions and the world systemic 
visibility of a particular environmental issue
Drawing upon the various examples of environmental conflict given in the above discussion ecological 
threats to state security can be defined in terms of two categories— threats originating at the global level and 
threats arising from the subnational level Threats originating at the global level can be further subdivided into 
two categories threats that might heighten interstate tensions by upsetting delicate power balances through 
differentiated local impacts— as might happen in South Asia were global warming to cause sea levels to rise and 
submerge parts of Bombay India but leave Karachi Pakistan undisturbed40— and threats that might cause large 
scale transboundary population movements as large areas become uninhabitable— for instance the rapidly 
expanding ozone hole over Antarctica has caused populations at the southern edge of the Australasian and Latin 
American land masses to move northwards
Similarly threats from the subnational level can be further subdivided into two categories— those that 
adversely effect state security through insurgent populations and those that anse from the transboundary 
migration of populations displaced by the ecological mismanagement of development projects or by rapid 
resource depletion through nonsustainable consumption patterns
Whatever their ongins ecological threats to state secunty only acquire their final form at the end of the 
causal chain cited earlier In that this chain is formed after three transitions that depend upon certain vanables 
varying these vanables in the nght amounts could prevent all of the transitions from occurring thereby averting 
ecological threats to state security In the event the causal chain has been completely formed and the security 
threat has fully matenalized any cnsis management measures would require a knowledge of those values of the 
vanables that permitted the cnsis to occur in the first place Subsequently the restoration of the vanables to
38 See Peter Gleick The Implications of Global Climatic Changes for International Secunty Cl unate Change 15( 1 2) (October 
1989) 309 325
39 See J  C Fannan B G Gardiner and J D Shanklin Large Losses of Total Ozone Reveal Seasonal CIO/NO Interaction 
Nature 315 (6016) 2 07 -210
40 In this regard see Republic o f Maldives Implications o f Sea Level Rise (The Hague Netherlands Ministry of Economic 
Affairs 1989) 17
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values that might have prevented the threat from materializing could be attempted though given long term 
alterations m resource use patterns these attempts might only be successful in a very limited fashion 
Therefore the key here lies not so much in damage control as m prevention
Preventing Environmental Security Threats
The first step m solving a problem lies in acquiring rehable knowledge about the problem Knowledge of 
ecological threats to state security is still anecdotal what is needed is a database that details possible threats 
along the Unes of the causal chain and the three transitions described earlier The database would provide 
knowledge about the values of the five critical variables in each situation that could potentially be an ecological 
crisis as well as about the critical points where the values of the variables permit transitions to the various 
stages m the causal chain
While alterations in the values of the five variables as well as the manner in which they are to be effected 
would vary from case to case certain general suggesuons can be presented here
First with regard to the political variables the key emphasis should be on increasing the responsiveness of 
political systems to environmental concerns While this is something that can only be accomplished from 
within a system international aid groups can provide grants for the development of strong environmental 
advocacy groups (as in most of the developed West) in the developing world that have the capacity to generate 
and push practical environmental legislative agendas In nondemocratic systems governments new found 
respect for their populations in the aftermath of the worldwide democracy wave could serve as a starting point 
for making them more responsive to ecological concerns In that responsive governments will be able to 
prevent frustrated populations displaced by environmental catastrophes from resorting to militancy the interests 
of interstate security would be well served
With regard to the second variable the level of technology the provision of environmental impact 
assessment technology to the developing countries would no doubt help in preventing development projects 
from turning into ecological disasters Fundamental change with regard to providing the appropriate 
technological backdrop for ecologically sound development practices however would only come about with the 
generation of appropriate local use technologies that do not simply attempt to ape Western technology but can 
promote development that is compatible with the local biological and social environments An example will 
illustrate this
As with some of their colleagues in the former Soviet Union during the Cold War Indian scientists and 
environmental experts have made vigorous use of leading international scientific journals not only to promote 
their concerns regarding the scientific non viability of development strategies that degrade biological and social 
environments but also to develop a consensus with their similarly concerned colleagues in other parts of the 
world Examples of such consensus building include the international acceptance of the work of Amulya Reddy 
and his colleagues at the Indian Institute of Science (IIS) in Bangalore 41
When the Indian state of Karnataka proposed a plan for increasing the electricity generating capacity of the 
state four times over by the year 2000 at a cost of $17 billion the IIS team developed an alternate plan that 
would cost only $6 billion provide electricity to all homes (something the government had not planned on 
doing) and cut carbon emissions by 100 000 tons over a ten year period The Reddy plan received widespread 
international support and the Karnataka government was eventually forced to concede that it not only had the 
wrong plan its plan was based on outmoded concepts and technologies that the bureaucracy bound state had not 
bothered to replace
41 See Mamie Stetson People Who Live in Green Houses World Watch (September-October 1991)
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Transnational interaction of the kind that led to the acceptance of the Reddy plan seems to be the most 
appropriate way to encourage the use of development technologies that will not result m the creation of long run 
security threats 42
With regard to the third set of factors or the societal variables the most urgent need would be to mitigate 
tendencies towards violent responses on the part of displaced populations Since these tendencies are largely due 
to a frustration with government for failing to provide for resettlement, an appropriate step for the international 
community might be to bring these populations within the purview of the various international conventions 
dealing with refugees In many developing countries the state is either incapable of caring for these people or 
tends to neglect them if they are socioeconomically marginalized to begin with
Given the tangible linkages between boundary tensions sectarian conflict, and uprooted populations it 
would behoove the United Nations and its various agencies to provide for ecological refugees in the same 
manner as it would for political and economic refugees While such UN involvement would be no substitute for 
the refugees not having to leave their land in the first place it is clear that international aid might just dampen 
frustrations to the point where they do not flare up To the extent that the refugees do not have legal recourse 
within their own countries they could be offered the protection of international law under the relevant 
provisions regarding the United Nations mandate to maintain international peace and security
It is with regard to the fourth set of variables the type of actors that the world community could be most 
effective The ways in which various intergovernmental organizations could facilitate dispute resolution has 
already been described Additionally numerous international as well as domestic NGOs provide advice support 
and technical help to similar groups in the developing world that wish to promote environmental security 
through the use of appropriate and ecologically sound development technologies What is needed here is a 
substantial leadership role by the leading actors m the world system— particularly the United States and the 
United Nations— m identifying potential ecological crises and dealing with them
For the most part this identification relates to the political and technological variables m any potential 
ecological crisis situation With regard to the social variables there is little that can be done from the outside to 
affect a society except, as pointed out above to try and prevent ecological refugees from resorting to militant 
actions The same can also be said for ecological threats with high system visibility— they have been so long 
in the making that little can be done about them in the short term
However to the extent that changes are made m the types of actors and the political and level of 
technology variables there is bound to be a reorientation of the development discourse in the direction of 
development planning and implementation that is compatible with both the social and the biological 
environments of the populations that are being subjected to the development process Given the ongoing 
changes in the world system described earlier the long term security imperatives of nation states might require 
them to reorient security investment away from defense spending and towards ecologically sustainable 
development Needless to say the benefits to all parties would be considerable if transnational and international 
actors with stakes in the process were to aid in this reorientation
42 In this regard see Paul Ekins A New World Order Grassroots Movements fo r  Global Change (London New York Routledge
1992)
